AN INTELLECTUAL MANIFESTO

My Philosophy of History and Writing

Research, imagination, and answerable action

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Understanding another person does not settle what I may do in her name.

Explanations can change what people are able to choose. An account of someone's needs may determine who speaks for her, what help she receives, or which refusal an institution will recognize. Whoever explains therefore exercises a power for which she must remain answerable. My central claim is that understanding becomes ethically inadequate when it leaves the person understood unable to challenge what is done with that understanding.

I am developing a research program whose ambition is to develop a school of thought through fiction, screenwriting, history, and economic theory. Its parts are dialogic pragmatism, Taleatrics, my work on preference and utility, and Quantum Market Dynamics with its proposed toposic extension. Some commitments already have precise formulations; some formal results belong to bounded constructions; other parts remain proposals. Their connection is a working undertaking that readers can examine, contest, and help redirect.

I oppose the treatment of understanding as permission, the conversion of recognition into possession, and the assumption that an explanation has finished with a person because it has made her intelligible. In economic inquiry, I also question the adequacy of fixing purposes in advance when the interaction being modeled can change them. These claims place obligations on my own writing. A character, a letter, or a calculation must be able to resist the account I hoped to give.

Dialogic pragmatism: what an answer must be able to change

The immediate path began while I was writing the original version of *The Schattendorf Echoes*. Wittgenstein's language games helped me ask how people act together while understanding the same words differently. "Protection" can name care, a contract, a police order, or a demand for obedience. Establishing what a speaker means still leaves the question of what the word permits her to do.

Dialogic pragmatism joins a right to answer with the practical capacity to change a shared undertaking. Its public reference statement is the ten postulates: locate claims; examine words in use; preserve differences of evidence and responsibility; protect the affected person's answer and refusal; test consensus against consequences; name responsibility; bound authority; and distribute the means of continuing without a single center. The postulates specify demands and dangers. They do not certify that an institution satisfying its own paperwork has become just.

Hermann's movement puts this commitment into four practical tests: another voice can change the next action; a material consequence can challenge an abstraction; a translation leaves its speaker room to correct it; and those bearing an authority's costs can stop it. These are the novel's formulation of the problem. Hermann can fail them. The companion's account explains their development; it does not turn her into the philosophy's infallible spokeswoman.

Consider an institution that records every objection but gives its chair sole power to decide whether an objection counts. My claim is that the record alone does not establish answerability. The test is whether an affected person can obtain a response, alter a decision, invoke an independent review, or end a particular grant of authority. A refusal must not silently become consent. Neither does every refusal automatically confer a veto over everyone else: the institution must state the scope of the decision, whose interests it affects, and how a disputed decision can be challenged.

The limit is consequential. Dialogue cannot make an armed opponent answer. Protective action needs resources, a named bearer, a defined task, review, and an ending. In the novels, a safeguard can preserve the language of objection while withholding the power to stop violence. That failure tests the method from within. The limits statement belongs beside the postulates.

A scene and the form that carries it

Hermann notices what Julia's actual key has done to her glove, then changes the key in the painting while the usable key remains unrepaired. The failure is hers before anyone explains it. Artistic attention has answered a problem in representation while leaving another person's practical difficulty in place. The scene allows readers to judge how far Hermann's conduct meets her principles.

The German cycle and Alistair's English account form a two-part invention. Their encounters can be shared while the voices differ in knowledge, desire, withholding, and responsibility. Alistair may know who caused an absence the German leaves unexplained; his knowledge may expose his complicity. Neither voice supplies an automatic final interpretation of the other. The Interval remains a contested relation whose consequences depend on what people can do and what they prevent others from doing.

Inside this outer relation, twelve-tone rows and fugal entries organize returns, reversals, delayed answers, and convergence. A recurring phrase can acquire force through a different speaker or a changed cost. A later Hermann can encounter an earlier one through the mansion, the staircase, a dream, or a painting; the inner fugue must make that encounter change something. The musical construction makes demands on sequence and recurrence. Its success depends on whether those demands become perceptible in the reading.

This is one way a mathematical or musical question changes a narrative's structure. It establishes no historical fact and proves no ethical principle. The formal design must answer to the scene: if an entry makes a person merely illustrate the scheme, the composition has failed that person. How the novels are composed follows the relationships in greater detail.

Taleatrics: a performance can change its performer

Taleatrics is my developing account of narrative, performance, and the recursive formation of identity and preference. A person anticipates an audience's judgment, acts in response, encounters the audience's reaction, and revises the

expectations or purposes with which she acts again. The audience may change too. A narrator or institution can arrange that exchange while presenting itself as merely describing it.

For example, a worker rehearses agreement because she expects promotion to depend on appearing loyal. Colleagues begin treating her as a committed supporter. She may adopt their account, resent it, or discover that promotion would bind her to a role she now wishes to refuse. These are different possible sequences. An explanation that simply assigns her an initial preference for promotion cannot decide which occurred.

The claim to test is that participation can alter the purposes by which someone evaluates the next encounter. Evidence would have to distinguish changed purposes from strategic concealment, new information, or a change in available options. Observed conduct alone may not settle that distinction. Taleatrics earns its place only where following the sequence explains something that a simpler account misses.

The panopticon sharpened my interest in how anticipated observation shapes conduct. Fiction extends that problem to the narrator and reader: who appears to see the whole, and what authority follows from the appearance? In the Committee Address, an institution recognizes an author's criticism of institutional recognition and turns the criticism into grounds for an award. The author's pleasure in recognition remains part of the problem.

Preference, value, and the assumptions of a model

My Holistic Preference and Utility Theory pursues how value changes across the connected circumstances of a life. Security, attachment, work, and the possibility of becoming someone different can affect one another. The claim is that some interactions change the terms of evaluation themselves; recording only a new ranking of a fixed menu may omit the event that made a new purpose intelligible.

A person seeking acceptance may discover its conditions and come to prefer refusal. An inquiry must establish whether she has revised a purpose, learned a previously hidden cost, or adapted to an opportunity she cannot obtain. I do not want the model to choose that explanation before the evidence does. A

proposed representation should state what it treats as a purpose, a constraint, a belief, and an available action, and what observations could require those categories to change.

This problem is distinct from my interest in relaxing convexity and quasi-concavity assumptions in economic models. In relevant equilibrium arguments, those assumptions do specific mathematical work. Quasi-concavity of utility is weaker than concavity. Removing an assumption requires identifying which conclusion loses its support and what, if anything, replaces it. Preference change does not itself supply a replacement existence proof.

Nor does nonconvexity by itself settle the fate of equilibrium. Results using aggregation and many agents already show why the answer depends on the economic setting. My program must identify its setting and compare its results with the applicable existing results. The aim is an argument about specified assumptions and consequences.

Quantum Market Dynamics: a small construction and its limits

QMD investigates whether quantum probability provides useful representations of context and the order of interactions in economic choice. “Quantum” here identifies mathematical objects and probability rules. It does not assert a physical quantum mechanism in the person choosing. The following elementary construction illustrates the proposed language; it is a standard kind of quantum-probability example, not a novel empirical result.

Let a two-dimensional state begin at $|a\rangle = (1, 0)$. Question A has “yes” direction $|a\rangle$; question B has “yes” direction $|b\rangle = (1, 1)/\sqrt{2}$. Each question has an orthogonal “no” direction. Use the squared projection for an answer’s probability and, after that answer, the normalized projected state for the next question.

A followed by B. A receives "yes" with probability 1. B then receives "yes" with probability 1/2. The probability of two "yes" answers is $1 \times 1/2 = 1/2$.

B followed by A. B receives "yes" with probability 1/2. In that resulting state, A receives "yes" with probability 1/2. The probability of two "yes" answers is $1/2 \times 1/2 = 1/4$.

The difference follows from the chosen state, questions, and update rule. It illustrates an order effect. Classical models with state changes can also produce order effects; observing one is not evidence by itself that the quantum model is preferable. A useful test would specify competing models, estimate their parameters, and compare predictions that were not used to fit them. Existing quantum-cognition research supplies both precedents and constraints for such work.

The two questions can be placed in a minimal purchasing example. Let A ask whether to buy one unit at a fixed price p, with wealth $m \geq p$; a purchase yields one unit and remaining money $m - p$. Let B be a preceding assessment of the producer. Under this illustrative update rule, asking A directly gives purchase probability 1; asking B first and retaining both B outcomes gives purchase probability 1/2. The budget and transfer are specified, but the chosen state is an assumption, not a measured consumer response.

This supplies a choice construction in an exchange setting. It does not determine price, supply, strategic interaction, or market equilibrium. "Market" names the intended extension of the research program. That extension must specify those objects and show what the added structure explains. The convexity question remains separate: the set of quantum states is itself convex. Adopting quantum probability therefore does not abolish the convexity assumptions of economics by definition.

Local accounts and the proposed toposic extension

Toposic Quantum Market Dynamics names a further direction involving structures defined in different contexts. The question is whether specified local accounts can be combined under explicit rules, and where that combination fails. A simple compatibility example makes the issue exact without claiming to provide a toposic economic theory.

Take three binary variables, A, B, and C, observed only in pairs. In context AB, allow 00 and 11, each with probability 1/2. In BC, allow the same two outcomes. In AC, allow 01 and 10, each with probability 1/2. Each single variable has the same half-and-half distribution wherever it occurs. The overlapping distributions therefore agree.

Yet no assignment to all three variables satisfies these supports. The first two contexts require $A = B$ and $B = C$; the third requires $A \neq C$. No global probability distribution can have all three specified pair distributions. The agreement on overlaps has not guaranteed a global joint account.

This is an abstract contextuality example of the kind studied through the sheaf-theoretic approach of Abramsky and Brandenburger. It neither establishes that these particular correlations have a quantum realization nor demonstrates an economic phenomenon. It also does not say that a genuinely compatible family of sections of a sheaf fails its gluing axiom. The distinction between marginal agreement and a global extension is the point.

For economic use, I would have to define the contexts, explain why an overlapping variable represents the same question in each, state the admissible local models, and identify evidence for their compatibility or conflict. Institutional accounts can disagree for ordinary reasons—different information, changed circumstances, or different questions. Giving those disagreements a mathematical vocabulary will help only if the definitions preserve such distinctions. The toposic extension remains a research direction requiring its own construction.

A result from the Marc biography

The biography's finite consistency model already addresses a bounded historical question: which specified readings of Franz and Maria Marc's March and April 1915 correspondence can coexist? The model separates a documentary constraint from an additional interpretive hypothesis. Its results concern those encodings; their historical justification remains open to scrutiny.

In the baseline construction, 15 binary propositions give $2^{15} = 32{,}768$ candidate assignments. The encoded documentary constraints fix 12 propositions and leave three independent choices, producing eight admissible assignments. Those remaining choices concern the scope of a claim about form, the later continuation of a war interpretation, and whether consent to withdraw an article was implemented. The eight cases express specified uncertainty. They are not eight complete biographies or equally probable histories.

One rejection needs only two propositions. Let A mean that Marc accepts artistic criticism on 6 April and W that he affirms a purifying interpretation of the war on that date. The model encodes the letter as $A = 1$, $W = 1$. Add the hypothesis that accepting the criticism entails abandoning that war interpretation, $A \Rightarrow \neg W$, and no assignment survives. Removing that added hypothesis restores compatibility. The result shows exactly which inference conflicts with the encoded passages.

The calculation does not diagnose Marc, prove that every other interpretation is false, or establish that publication consent took effect. Readers can challenge the selection, translation, scope, or coding of the evidence and then examine the consequences of a different construction. The biography's Chapters 19–20 and computational companion provide the fuller definitions and calculations. This is the kind of exact disagreement I want the broader program to make possible.

Where the project stands among other work

Bakhtin's account of dialogic voices and the pragmatist traditions of Dewey and Mead are interlocutors, not territories to claim as unoccupied. Wittgenstein's attention to use helps locate a word in a practice. My proposed emphasis is on

the passage from being understood to acquiring an effective part in the next decision. A claim to add something must be established through particular arguments and constructions.

Habermas makes the possible agreement of those affected central to the justification of norms. His work cannot fairly be reduced to polite consensus. My emphasis here is on the institutions needed for action while disagreement persists, and on the authority an actual objection can change. Fraser and Honneth's debate about recognition and redistribution, and Hirschman's distinction between exit and voice, make the distribution of practical power an existing conversation that this project must enter.

Goffman's performed selves and Foucault's treatment of surveillance precede Taleatrics' concern with audience and conduct. Psychological game theory already permits payoffs to depend on beliefs, including beliefs about beliefs. Taleatrics' proposed task is to trace how an encounter can remake a participant's evaluative purposes and the authority arranging the encounter. That proposal needs to demonstrate what its account adds.

Elster on adaptive preferences, Akerlof and Kranton on identity, Sen on agency and commitment, and Fricker on the resources through which experience becomes intelligible bear directly on my preference inquiry. I must distinguish a changed purpose from accommodation to deprivation, strategic behavior, and newly available language. QMD belongs in comparison with quantum cognition, including Busemeyer and Bruza and the question-order work of Wang and colleagues. Its toposic direction must engage the definitions and results of existing contextuality research.

These comparisons identify obligations of argument. The linked references below establish starting points; no list of predecessors substitutes for a demonstrated difference.

A life of inquiry

My father gave me an early standard for intellectual life: know how to find an answer, and learn to think, write, and speak well. In his home office he kept the sign, "Put your brain into gear before your mouth into motion." A cardiovascular and thoracic surgeon who also maintained a general medical

practice, he gave patients time and attention. He encouraged both medicine and writing. While I was still in high school, he proposed that I write a newspaper column; the publisher declined. His confidence mattered even when it produced no appointment.

In summer 1980, I studied number theory with Arnold E. Ross at Ohio State University. I remember him starting with an idea at the center of the blackboard and following its implications until the board was full. That example remains with me when a qualification in a letter, a term of payment, or a change of speaker opens a larger inquiry. My first encounter with Franz Marc came in an art-history course at Santa Ana College. In Munich in 1981, I saw his work in person.

I entered UC San Diego in physics and moved through chemistry toward history. James K. Lyon's teaching of Brecht and histories of psychological thought, and Steven Hahn's course on slavery and emancipation, helped make questions of organized power and individual experience urgent. David S. Luft became my most sustained teacher in history and supervised my undergraduate work on Austria's crisis of 1927. His engagement with literature, especially Musil, encouraged me to take ambiguity seriously. I completed my B.A. in history in 1984.

H. Stuart Hughes and Judith M. Hughes helped me ask what problems ideas answered and what a person might have invested in an interpretation. Allan Mitchell made institutions visible through ordinary experience: I still remember his account of Parisians naming their refuse containers after Poubelle. His guidance on white-collar Germany, railways, and Bavaria joined social position to the arrangements that make action possible. John Marino introduced me to the *Annales* tradition and taught me to read acknowledgments as evidence of intellectual formation.

At Caltech, where I completed an M.S. in social science, economics and game theory required me to specify alternatives, information, and constraints. Lance E. Davis's economic history joined explanatory ambition to documentary work. Philip T. Hoffman's later work sharpened questions about resources, competition, and sustained experimentation. These questions recur in the biography's inquiry into advances, payment, and the custody of manuscripts.

At Emory, my work with Sally Wolff King included helping transcribe and edit Jimmy Faulkner's recorded recollections for *Talking About William Faulkner*. Making speech readable while preserving its idiom and rhythm taught me to attend to a voice before imposing an order on it. An editor's clarifications can change what a reader is able to hear.

After my father's death, I had to learn the tax law surrounding his estate and assume increasing responsibility for the family trust. Business and tax practice entered a life I had expected to devote to study. I returned to education at Caltech and Emory, but family responsibilities repeatedly drew me away; I did not complete a doctorate. While caring for my mother, I returned to writing, history, and economics. Those responsibilities belong in the account of how this work became possible, alongside the opportunities they cost.

Works, status, and ways to read

- *Die Schattendorfer Echos* and *The Schattendorf Echoes—Lord Alistair's Rendering*: two completed five-volume cycles, with companions. The English translation of the German cycle is a separate edition. Public samples and professional reading access are available.
- *Franz Marc: Religion, Art, and Modern Europe*: completed English and German biography manuscripts; the correspondence model and computational companion have a stated, bounded scope. Samples and review access are available.
- *Wondrous Travels*: completed six-volume literary cycle; begin with the public sample.
- *Case 1638: Recall* and the other Case 1638 works: screenplays and short fiction, with samples and professional materials. *Recall* received first place in the 2026 Scriptapalooza screenplay competition, listed under Liana Sive.
- *The Unnamed Daughter* and *Double or Nothing*: completed criticism and drama manuscripts, respectively.

- Dialogic pragmatism: public postulates, institutional applications, and limits. Taleatrics, preference and utility theory, QMD, and its toposic extension remain developing theoretical projects; the examples here do not certify completed theories.

Selected points of comparison

M. M. Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*; John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*; George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*; Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*. Jürgen Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other*, chapter 1; Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition?*; Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*.

Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*; Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*; John Geanakoplos, David Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti, "Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality," *Games and Economic Behavior* 1 (1989), 60–79. Jon Elster, *Sour Grapes*; George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, "Economics and Identity," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115 (2000), 715–753; Amartya Sen, "Rational Fools," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 6 (1977), 317–344; Miranda Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice*.

Robert J. Aumann, "Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders," *Econometrica* 34 (1966), 1–17; Ross M. Starr, "Quasi-Equilibria in Markets with Non-Convex Preferences," *Econometrica* 37 (1969), 25–38. Jerome R. Busemeyer and Peter D. Bruza, *Quantum Models of Cognition and Decision* (2012); Zheng Wang and colleagues, "Context Effects Produced by Question Orders Reveal Quantum Nature of Human Judgments" (2014); Samson Abramsky and Adam Brandenburger, "The Sheaf-Theoretic Structure of Non-Locality and Contextuality" (2011).

Satire and the continuation of the work

Before Sive / After Sive belongs beside this statement. Its Academy turns recognition into authority, while the author's ambition supplies some of the fuel. The satire includes my habits of explaining, arranging, and building systems. Announcing openness to criticism cannot mean that every objection has already been answered.

Begin with *The Last Book Published Before Literature Began*, where a librarian needs to get her daughter in from the rain. The Committee Address provides the ceremony that makes this difficult. The story tests the manifesto's claims through conduct, including the conduct of an author pleased by her own monument.

A research program becomes more than its founder's self-description when other people can use its distinctions, reject an inference, supply a better construction, and continue without requiring her permission. I want the work to meet that test. Its next development must come through results and writing that readers can examine closely enough to change the undertaking.